Who can decrypt my journal data?
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Hi! I’ve read your encryption information and I can’t tell if it’s up-to-date, considering your FAQ points to a 2017 blog entry. Could someone answer a few questions for me?
- If I use Day One on iOS and macOS, the FAQ says the key is kept on iCloud, but you were going to give an option to turn that off. Has that option been added?
- If the Day One key has to be stored in iCloud, and I have Advanced Data Protection enabled, is there any way Apple can get access to that key?
- Is your macOS app in some kind of encrypted container that prevents local malware from casually grabbing copies of the journal entries, attachments, search indexes, or anything else that would disclose the journal information?
Thank you!
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Hi, @casualjacket! I want to make sure we get all of this right for you, so I’ve shared your questions with our developers. We’ll let you know as soon as we hear back.
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Hi @casualjacket – we have answers to your question from our product team.
If I use Day One on iOS and macOS, the FAQ says the key is kept on iCloud, but you were going to give an option to turn that off. Has that option been added?
The option to remove the key from iCloud is:
- iOS: Settings > Sync > Advanced Sync Settings > Only Store Encryption Key in Keychain
- Mac: Settings > Sync > Advanced > Automatically save key to iCloud
If the Day One key has to be stored in iCloud, and I have Advanced Data Protection enabled, is there any way Apple can get access to that key?
If you have Advanced Data Protection enabled, then even if you store your key in iCloud, there’s no way for Apple to access it.
Is your macOS app in some kind of encrypted container that prevents local malware from casually grabbing copies of the journal entries, attachments, search indexes, or anything else that would disclose the journal information?
The macOS app uses a standard system application container, and the system permissions system will prevent other applications from accessing it unless the user gives that other app explicit permission. But it is not in a special encrypted container. If local malware were somehow installed with administrator rights that allow it to bypass those permissions, then it would also be able to read from such an encrypted container whenever the app is running; an encrypted container would not protect the data.
I hope that helps! Let us know if you have any other questions.
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@staff-bluejay thank you for this information! I think these are mostly the answers I wanted to hear, too. (Kind of weird since I think a lot of more general “note editing” apps are not up to this level of security, from what I’ve seen so far.)
Have a great day!
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